论文部分内容阅读
本文主要研究第三方物流服务企业与客户之间的契约选择问题。在委托代理模型的基础上,文章研究了物流服务企业努力水平可观测、客户企业努力水平可观测以及双方努力水平都不可观测三种假设条件下最优契约的选择。研究表明,当物流服务企业的努力水平可以通过契约来强制规定时,客户企业可以选择固定费用合同来获得双方都满意的结果;当客户企业的努力水平可观测时,采用特许经营权的契约方式可以达到系统最优的结果;当双方努力水平都不可观测时,采用基于产出绩效的契约是最合适的且这种契约只能是次优的。
This paper mainly studies the contract selection between the third-party logistics service companies and customers. Based on the principal-agent model, the article studies the choice of the optimal contract under three assumptions: the observable level of effort of the logistics service company, the observability of the client company’s effort level, and the unobservable level of both parties’ efforts. Research shows that when the level of efforts of logistics service companies can be stipulated by contracts, client companies can choose fixed-cost contracts to obtain satisfactory results for both parties; when the level of effort of customer companies is observable, the use of franchise contracts The optimal results of the system can be achieved; when both parties’ effort levels are not observable, it is most appropriate to adopt a contract based on output performance and this contract can only be sub-optimal.