论文部分内容阅读
在矿业权拍卖出让过程中,政府不仅要使矿业权以尽可能高的价格出让,还要充分考虑资源高效利用与环境保护等非价格因素。然而,迄今我国的矿业权出让多为一维的价格竞争,缺乏能够实现地质环境保护与资源高效利用的出让机制。为此,文章设计了一种附加资源与环境保护约束的矿业权招标出让机制,并通过建立博弈模型来分析政府与投资者的均衡策略。研究表明,要求投资者增加资源与环境保护投入会导致矿业权出让收益减少,因此政府要在这两方面目标之间进行权衡,政府将根据边际条件确定最优的资源与环境保护投入。
During the auction of the mining rights, the government should not only sell the mining rights at the highest possible price but also give full consideration to non-price factors such as the efficient use of resources and environmental protection. However, till now, the transfer of mining rights in our country is mostly one-dimensional price competition, and there is a lack of transfer mechanism that can realize the protection of geological environment and the efficient use of resources. To this end, the article designs a bidding and bidding mechanism for mining rights with additional resources and environmental protection constraints, and analyzes the equilibrium strategy between the government and investors through the establishment of a game model. The research shows that requiring investors to increase investment in resources and environmental protection will lead to the reduction of proceeds from mining rights transfer. Therefore, the government should make trade-offs between the two objectives and the government will determine the optimal investment in resources and environmental protection based on the marginal conditions.