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Standard & Poor’s （S&P） reported that Chinese enterprises had borrowed US$14.2 trillion， higher than US$13.1-trillion borrowing of the U.S. enterprises. This made Chinese enterprises the largest debtor in the world， a year earlier than the expectation of S&P.
The international ratings agency also forecast that the liabilities owed by Chinese enterprises will take one third of the global liability market in the next five years. Another group of data showed that the Chinese enterprises’ cash flow and leverage utility began to worsen as of 2009. Now it ranked the last in the list of global enterprises in terms of the cash flow and leverage.
The risk data from S&P matches the judgment of several research organizations. The space for the enterprises to leverage has been shrinking since 2009， which further limits the expan- sion of the liability.
Rising Leverage Ratio
S&P’s data shows that Chinese turned to the shadow bank to solve one third of their debts. The size of the shadow bank in China is expected to be between 4 and 5 trillion U.S. dollars， and it is very likely to grow in the next five years.
The Financial Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published the research report that the scale of nonconventional credit financing involved the generalized shadow bank is about 27 trillion yuan， accounting for 19% of the banking assets. This figure is almost the same with the estimation S&P has made.
“We have never compared the data about the total volume， but our estimation about the risk resonates with the judgment of many research institutions. We share the belief that the space for leverage has been shrinking since 2009， reducing the enterprises’ power to borrow more money，” said the director of a Shenzhen-based securities company’s strategic analysis department.
An anonymous securities dealer said that the liability is not horrible in the static state. The biggest concern is that it could influence the enterprises’ future cash flow and asset balance in the dynamic state. “If the liability leverage is too high and the profit margin of core assets decreases， the cost will surpass the revenue， leading to the loss. If there is the long-term loss， the market value of the enterprise will drop dramatically， which might reduce the enterprise’s assets to the point lower than the debts. That’s why so many listed companies in China have such low assessed market value， because investors think it unwise to make long-term investment.” The Likely Controllable Risk
S&P’s report showed special concerns for the property and steel industry in China. The increasing inventory of land and houses lead to the deficiency in the increase of housing. This also leads to the shrunken demand of the steel. S&P forecasts that there will be more defaults in the steel industry – the continuous drop in the iron ore price has already proven this risk.
The watchdog is also showing its concerns over the leverage ratio of Chinese enterprises. On June 17， Shanghai Stock Exchanges and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges simultaneously issued the risk warnings to the listed companies with the below Acredit ratings and those having negative figures in the net profits.
However， Guo Tianyong， director of the Banking Industry Research Center at Central University of Finance and Economics， said that the situation S&P reported happened to all countries when their economic development began to slow down. Therefore， it is not right to say that the risk is uncontrollable in light of the current situation.
“Our major problem at this moment is brought by the rising shadow bank and the high financing cost formed from various financial businesses. This is a great feature of the Chinese economy. The current main goal is to reduce the intermediary links， optimize the financing structure and lower the financing cost，” Guo said.
Three Measures to Lower the Risk
In spite of the possibility to control the risk， it is still an important task to re- duce the liability of companies.
Sun Lijian， Vice Dean of Economic School at Fudan University， said that the government should use supervisory methods instead of regulatory ones. In another word， the market-oriented methods should be used to eliminate the underperforming enterprises.
Sun Lijian proposed three advices. The first one is to intensify the financial regulation and make those pay dearly for their venturing for high profits from mispairing. The market should say no to the organizations having failed to control the risk. The central bank should prepare in advance for the aid to those suffering systematic risks， but the aid only comes out when it is necessary. The supervision-oriented methods target the speculation in the market and aims at lowering the uncertainty of enterprises when they are confronted with the risks.
The second advice is to open the profit channel for the real economy. If the financial institutions that provide services for the real economy， investors will risk their capital in the speculative actions. Without the rewards for the efforts， the real economy of China will not revive either. To achieve this goal， the government needs to change its function and gives the decision-making force back to the market.
The third advice is that the administrative supervision should no longer be a measure. The system to supervise the efficiency must be adopted， based on which any misbehavior will be punished severely. The financial innovations need to be encouraged. To be simply speaking， the law should punish those injured the people with knives instead of punishing the knives. The administrative method is like punishing the knife and that was China did in the past. The countries with developed financial system know it is the“knife-wielder” to be punished and how to punish him. Their experiences are worth learning in China.
The international ratings agency also forecast that the liabilities owed by Chinese enterprises will take one third of the global liability market in the next five years. Another group of data showed that the Chinese enterprises’ cash flow and leverage utility began to worsen as of 2009. Now it ranked the last in the list of global enterprises in terms of the cash flow and leverage.
The risk data from S&P matches the judgment of several research organizations. The space for the enterprises to leverage has been shrinking since 2009， which further limits the expan- sion of the liability.
Rising Leverage Ratio
S&P’s data shows that Chinese turned to the shadow bank to solve one third of their debts. The size of the shadow bank in China is expected to be between 4 and 5 trillion U.S. dollars， and it is very likely to grow in the next five years.
The Financial Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published the research report that the scale of nonconventional credit financing involved the generalized shadow bank is about 27 trillion yuan， accounting for 19% of the banking assets. This figure is almost the same with the estimation S&P has made.
“We have never compared the data about the total volume， but our estimation about the risk resonates with the judgment of many research institutions. We share the belief that the space for leverage has been shrinking since 2009， reducing the enterprises’ power to borrow more money，” said the director of a Shenzhen-based securities company’s strategic analysis department.
An anonymous securities dealer said that the liability is not horrible in the static state. The biggest concern is that it could influence the enterprises’ future cash flow and asset balance in the dynamic state. “If the liability leverage is too high and the profit margin of core assets decreases， the cost will surpass the revenue， leading to the loss. If there is the long-term loss， the market value of the enterprise will drop dramatically， which might reduce the enterprise’s assets to the point lower than the debts. That’s why so many listed companies in China have such low assessed market value， because investors think it unwise to make long-term investment.” The Likely Controllable Risk
S&P’s report showed special concerns for the property and steel industry in China. The increasing inventory of land and houses lead to the deficiency in the increase of housing. This also leads to the shrunken demand of the steel. S&P forecasts that there will be more defaults in the steel industry – the continuous drop in the iron ore price has already proven this risk.
The watchdog is also showing its concerns over the leverage ratio of Chinese enterprises. On June 17， Shanghai Stock Exchanges and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges simultaneously issued the risk warnings to the listed companies with the below Acredit ratings and those having negative figures in the net profits.
However， Guo Tianyong， director of the Banking Industry Research Center at Central University of Finance and Economics， said that the situation S&P reported happened to all countries when their economic development began to slow down. Therefore， it is not right to say that the risk is uncontrollable in light of the current situation.
“Our major problem at this moment is brought by the rising shadow bank and the high financing cost formed from various financial businesses. This is a great feature of the Chinese economy. The current main goal is to reduce the intermediary links， optimize the financing structure and lower the financing cost，” Guo said.
Three Measures to Lower the Risk
In spite of the possibility to control the risk， it is still an important task to re- duce the liability of companies.
Sun Lijian， Vice Dean of Economic School at Fudan University， said that the government should use supervisory methods instead of regulatory ones. In another word， the market-oriented methods should be used to eliminate the underperforming enterprises.
Sun Lijian proposed three advices. The first one is to intensify the financial regulation and make those pay dearly for their venturing for high profits from mispairing. The market should say no to the organizations having failed to control the risk. The central bank should prepare in advance for the aid to those suffering systematic risks， but the aid only comes out when it is necessary. The supervision-oriented methods target the speculation in the market and aims at lowering the uncertainty of enterprises when they are confronted with the risks.
The second advice is to open the profit channel for the real economy. If the financial institutions that provide services for the real economy， investors will risk their capital in the speculative actions. Without the rewards for the efforts， the real economy of China will not revive either. To achieve this goal， the government needs to change its function and gives the decision-making force back to the market.
The third advice is that the administrative supervision should no longer be a measure. The system to supervise the efficiency must be adopted， based on which any misbehavior will be punished severely. The financial innovations need to be encouraged. To be simply speaking， the law should punish those injured the people with knives instead of punishing the knives. The administrative method is like punishing the knife and that was China did in the past. The countries with developed financial system know it is the“knife-wielder” to be punished and how to punish him. Their experiences are worth learning in China.