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目的:为政府完善对基本药物生产企业行为的监督约束提供参考。方法:构建政府对企业的监督约束模型,确定政府的最优监督检查的概率和企业最优的违规生产的概率。结果:政府以γ/2π+γ+φ(π为企业正常生产得到的净合约收益,γ为企业通过减少成本而增加的收益,φ为企业不生产或低质量生产基本药物的处罚)的最优概率选择监督,企业则以c/π+φ-e+∏(c为政府监督检查的成本,∏为企业根据合约提供合格的基本药物为政府带来的收益,e为摩擦成本)的最优概率选择不按合约生产,这是政府和企业的纳什均衡策略。结论:政府应该对企业不按合约生产的行为加大惩罚力度,对基本药物的强制性降价的幅度要适度,还应提高监督检查的效率以降低监督成本,并对按合约生产基本药物的企业提供一定的政策支持。
Objective: To provide reference for the government to improve the supervision and restraint on the behavior of the essential drug manufacturers. Methods: Constructing a government supervision and restraint model for enterprises, determining the probability of the optimal supervision and inspection of the government and the probability of the optimal non-compliant production. Results: The government, which is γ / 2π + γ + φ (π is the net contract revenue generated by the normal operation of the enterprise, γ is the revenue increased by the enterprise through cost reduction and φ is the punishment imposed by enterprises on non-production or low-quality production of essential drugs) Optimal choice of probabilistic monitoring, while the enterprise is based on c / π + φ-e + Π (c is the cost of government supervision and inspection, Π for the government to provide qualified basic drugs under the contract for the government revenue, e is the friction cost) optimal Probability of choice is not contract production, which is the government and business Nash equilibrium strategy. Conclusion: The government should increase penalties for enterprises that do not follow contractual contracts. The mandatory price reduction for essential drugs should be modest, and the efficiency of supervision and inspection should be enhanced so as to reduce supervision costs. Enterprises that contract for the production of essential drugs should also be increased. Provide some policy support.