论文部分内容阅读
借助社会嵌入与信息经济学理论,本文构建了一个理论框架来解释转型经济中公司的透明度选择策略,并使用中国上市公司的数据进行了实证检验。结果显示,公司的财务业绩与互联网关注度会导致企业采用更积极的透明度策略,进行更充分的信息披露;而政治关联水平则严重地导致了消极的信息披露与低的透明度水平。此外,我们发现没有证据支持更强的研发能力对公司透明度水平有显著的影响。总体而言,中国资本市场中的公司透明度存在着较明显的“逆向选择”现象,这可能使得透明度监管政策与其核心内涵相背离。
With the theory of social embedding and information economics, this paper constructs a theoretical framework to explain the company’s transparency selection strategy in a transitional economy and conducts an empirical test using the data of Chinese listed companies. The results show that the company’s financial performance and Internet awareness will lead to a more transparent corporate transparency strategy for information disclosure; while the level of political connection has led to a serious negative disclosure and low level of transparency. In addition, we found that there is no evidence that stronger research and development capabilities have a significant impact on the level of corporate transparency. In general, there is a clear “adverse selection” phenomenon in corporate transparency in Chinese capital markets, which may make the transparency regulation policy deviate from its core content.