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胡塞尔运用先验现象学的方法对建立在自然因果律和经验心理主义基础上的动机论进行了批判。他指出,动机不是经验事件的发生,它属于精神因果性,是精神事件的发生。对动机的讨论不能采取心理联想和经验事实的解释方法,这是一种自然主义的实在论立场。现象学的动机论必须从先天的本质结构层面来考察。伦理意志的动机属于精神科学的领域,对此我们只能采取现象学的理解方法。为此,胡塞尔不仅区分了主动的动机和被动的动机,而且指出了动机在精神主体的人格自我中的起源。结合伦理学史关于理性动机和情感动机的争论,胡塞尔深入批判了以休谟为代表的情感动机论和以康德为代表的义务动机论。最后他指出,规定意志的伦理动机主要有两方面:一是价值;二是人格自身规定的义务意识,即人格动机。
Husserl used the method of transcendental phenomenology to criticize the motivation theory based on natural causation and empiricism. He pointed out that motivation is not the occurrence of empirical events, it belongs to the spiritual causality, is the occurrence of mental events. The discussion of motivation can not take psychological association and empirical factual interpretation of the method, which is a naturalistic realist position. The theory of phenomenology of motivation must be examined from the innate level of the essential structure. The motive of ethical will belongs to the field of psychology, for which we can only adopt phenomenological understanding. For this reason, Husserl not only distinguished between active and passive motives, but also pointed out the origin of motivation in the personality self of the spiritual subject. Combining with the debate about rational motivation and emotional motivation in Histories of Ethics, Husserl criticized in depth the emotional motivation theory represented by Hume and the voluntary motivation theory represented by Kant. Finally, he pointed out that there are mainly two aspects to the ethical motive of stipulating the will: one is value; the other is the obligation consciousness stipulated by personality itself, that is personality motivation.