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本文以宁夏平罗县宝平村[由于调查信息涉及较为敏感,为了保护当地隐私,我们化名该村为宝平村。]为研究对象,通过实地调查和访谈发现,在国家政策的支持下,正规金融机构(农村信用社)触角伸入农村后,高利贷现象仍然存在。这和人们通常从信息不对称理论分析的正规金融机构进入农村后可以抑制高利贷的推论不吻合。通过进一步研究我们发现:农村信用社和高利贷者基于各自的利益形成合谋关系,而不是竞争和替代关系。某种程度上国家支农政策成为高利贷得以生存的温床。一方面,成为高利贷放贷资金的最主要来源和保证;另一方面,农民收入的稳定与增长使资金得以及时回流,高利贷借贷过程得以持续。在这些发现的基础上,本文对当前国家的支农政策做了进一步思考。
In this paper, Ping Village, Pingxia County, Ningxia [due to the survey information is more sensitive, in order to protect the local privacy, we alias the village for the village of Baoping. ] As the research object. Through the field survey and interviews, it is found that with the support of national policies, the usury phenomenon still exists after the tentacles of formal financial institutions (RCCs) reach rural areas. This is not consistent with the corollary of people’s inhibition of usury after their entry into the countryside, which is usually analyzed by the theory of asymmetric information. After further research, we found that rural credit cooperatives and usurers formed collusive relations based on their respective interests rather than competition and alternative relations. To some extent, the state’s supporting agriculture policy has become a breeding ground for usury. On the one hand, it became the most important source and guarantee for the lending of loan-sharking loans. On the other hand, the stability and growth of peasants’ income helped the funds to flow back in time and the loan lending process for usury continued. On the basis of these findings, this article gives further consideration to the current state’s supporting agriculture policy.