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日本的企业,彼此之间持有对方的股票是非常普遍的,脱离开相互持股无法把握日本 企业的治理结构。相互持股创造出了大量的不行使投票权的“稳定股东”,而且在日本 企业股权法人化,经营者作为股东代言人的条件下,这些“稳定股东”实际上是由一个个的企业经营者来扮演的。从控制权和剩余索取权的角度,日本企业中的经营者已经成了虚拟大股东,在企业中最具发言权。
It is very common for Japanese companies to hold each other's shares among themselves, and it is impossible to grasp the governance structure of Japanese companies without mutual holding. Mutual ownership has created a large number of “stable shareholders” who do not exercise their voting rights. And under the conditions of legalization of Japanese corporate ownership and managers as the spokesman for shareholders, these “stable shareholders” actually consist of individual shareholders To play. From the perspective of control and residual claims, the managers of Japanese companies have become virtual large shareholders and have the most say in the business.