论文部分内容阅读
巨灾保险具有准公共物品属性,既可以由政府提供,也可以由市场提供,单纯依靠政府和私人市场提供都存在较大弊端,政府和私人部门合作,采用混合供给模式可以形成互补优势,提高效率,这已成为国际巨灾保险市场发展的一大趋势。本文以混合供给模式下的巨灾保险市场为对象,分析巨灾保险市场中的委托代理关系,并对如何构建有效的激励与约束机制进行了初步探讨。
Catastrophe insurance has the properties of quasi-public goods, which can be provided by the government or by the market. There is a big drawback to relying solely on the government and the private market. With the cooperation of the government and the private sector, the hybrid supply mode can form a complementary advantage and increase Efficiency, which has become a major trend in the development of the international catastrophe insurance market. Based on the catastrophe insurance market under the mixed supply model, this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship in the catastrophe insurance market and discusses how to construct an effective incentive and restraint mechanism.