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人们一般认为布拉德雷提出一种真之一致论,并在这一点上把他的哲学与被认为赞同真之符合论(a correspondence theory of truth)的分析哲学先驱穆尔和罗素的观点进行对比。S.坎德利施(Candlish)显然没有这做样,他最近论证说,这种对比基于一系列误解,一方面是对布拉德雷的误解,另一方面是对罗素和穆尔的误解。根据他的观点,关于真,穆尔和罗素(至少在其早期论著中)与布拉德雷是一致的。但这不是因为穆尔和罗素是一致论者,也不是因为布拉德雷是符合论者;相反,他们都共同信奉一种被坎德利施称为“真之同一论”(identity theory of truth)的观点。尽管我同意坎德利施的核心论题,但是我不完全同意他关于布拉德雷立场的观点。我在这里不是要与坎德利施争论,而是要讨论真之理论在这些哲
It is generally thought that Bradley proposed a true oneness and, in this connection, put his philosophy with the views of analytic philosophers Moore and Russell, who were deemed to agree with the a correspondence theory of truth Compared. Clearly this is not the case with Candlish, who recently argued that the comparison is based on a series of misunderstandings, one that is a misunderstanding of Bradley and the other of a misunderstanding of Russell and Moore . According to him, there is agreement with Bradley about Truth, Moore and Russell (at least in his early writings). But this is not because Moore and Russell were unanimous, nor because Bradley was a fitter; on the contrary, they both shared a belief that what Kandlik called the "identity theory of Truth. Although I agree with Kandelish’s central theme, I do not fully agree with his view on Bradley’s position. Here I am not going to argue with Kandelich, but to discuss the theory of truth in these philosophers