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本文以多任务委托一代理分析框架对公共部门资产所有权、管理权的配置和预算规则的确定做出研究。公共资产的国家所有权不利于提高代理人管好资产的积极性,却是次优的选择。在公共资产国家所有权安排下,对代理人实行激励合同对委托人是不利的。对于委托人的目标单一且代理人绩效考核容易的活动,实施代理人所有权加激励合同是最优的。对事业单位国有资产有偿使用收入需要结合事业单位改革的进程,按照激励和约束并重原则进行管理。在公共资产管理机构设置上,如果将难以监督的公共资产管理交给一个机构,而易于监督的政府采购活动交给另一个机构,则有可能发挥专业化分工的优势管理好政府资产。如果公共部门代理人的努力不仅决定公共产出的数量,而且决定公共资产存量的配置和利用效率,则定额或定项补助的预算就可能优于以总产出水平为依据的激励性预算。作者并对公益一类和公益二类事业单位预算规则给出了模型建议。
In this paper, multi-tasking commissioned a proxy analysis framework for public sector asset ownership, management of the configuration and budget rules to make a study. State ownership of public assets is not conducive to raising the enthusiasm of the agents to manage the assets, but it is the second best choice. Under the arrangement of ownership by public assets, it is unfavorable for the principal to apply the incentive contract to the agent. For the client’s single goal and the agent’s performance appraisal easy activities, the implementation of the agent ownership and incentive contract is the best. It is necessary to combine the progress of the reform of public institutions with the paid use of state-owned assets of public institutions, and manage them in accordance with the principle of equal emphasis on incentives and restraints. In the setting of public asset management institutions, if it is difficult to supervise the management of public assets to one institution and the supervised government procurement activities to another institution, then it is possible to take advantage of the specialization of labor to manage the government assets. If efforts by public-sector agents determine not only the amount of public output but also the allocation and utilization efficiency of the stock of public assets, the budget for fixed or fixed subsidies may be superior to the incentive budget based on aggregate output levels. The author also gives a model suggestion for the public welfare and public welfare second-class public institution budget rules.