我国现行反垄断执法机构职权错乱之反思——由“电信、联通垄断案”展开

• 作 者: 黄诗斯
• 机 构: 华侨大学法学院,
• 出 处: 法制与社会
• 发表日期: 2013年20期
• 关键词: 反垄断 执法机构 司法模式 行政模式 独立性

国企是我国垄断的主要力量,“电信、联通垄断案”又一次提醒了公众这一基本事实。我国国企垄断与反垄断执法机构的设置及其权力分配的错乱不无关系,将反垄断执法权赋予与国企利益攸关的行政机构显然是不恰当的。采用司法反垄断模式,将司法权引入到反垄断中来是一个可行的途径,而建立统一而独立的反垄断执法机构刻不容缓。

State-owned enterprises are the main force of monopoly in our country, and “Telecommunications, Unicom’s Monopoly Case” once again reminds the public of this basic fact. The monopoly of state-owned enterprises in our country is not only related to the establishment of antitrust law enforcement agencies and the dislocation of power distribution. It is obviously not appropriate to give antitrust enforcement power to the administrative organs that are of crucial interest to state-owned enterprises. Adopting the judicial antitrust model and introducing the judicial power into the antitrust is a feasible way, and it is imperative to establish a unified and independent antitrust law enforcement agency.