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运用博弈论理论,建立了证券监管问题的非合作博弈模型。通过对该模型的纯策略均衡和混合策略均衡的分析,从理论上确立了预防证券违法的思路,并结合实际分析了我国股票市场的监管问题,认为目前我国股票市场中违法操作已成为投资者的占优策略,而监管者则是在有选择的监管。因此,加强证券监管不仅要加大对违法操作投资者的惩罚力度,也要对监管者施行有效的激励—约束机制。
By using game theory, this paper establishes a non-cooperative game model of securities regulatory issues. Through the analysis of pure strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy equilibrium of the model, the idea of preventing illegal securities is theoretically established, and the supervision of the stock market in our country is analyzed in combination with the actual situation. At present, the illegal operation in the stock market of our country has become an investor The dominant strategy, while the regulator is in the selective supervision. Therefore, to strengthen the supervision of securities should not only increase the penalties for illegal operation of investors, but also for the regulator to implement an effective incentive-restraint mechanism.