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中央政府(高层政府)的集权与地方政府(低层政府)的分权一直是多级治理体系中一个两难的选择困境。高层集权有利于资源的集中、政策的制定,利于改革的统一推进以及财政等资源的有效分配;低层分权则有利于调动地方政府的积极性与创造性,充分挖掘地方资源,实现地方治理能力的最大发挥。反之,高度的集权又容易抑制地方创新,弱化地方行政责任,导致地方的行政低效;高度的分权,又使地方在改革中得不到中央的有效支持,出现法律缺失、财政不足等问题。通过美国(加利福尼亚州)与澳大利亚两地在处理城市废水循环项目中的措施来分析多级治理体系中权力结构对改革效率的影响。研究表明,在两种治理体系中,当面对相同的改革障碍和改革动力时,两地的改革能力与政策效果是不同的。
Centralization of the Central Government (High-level Government) and Decentralization of the Local Government (Lower-level Government) have always been a dilemma in the multi-level governance system. The centralization of resources is conducive to the concentration of resources, the formulation of policies, the uniform promotion of reform and the effective distribution of resources such as finance. Low-level decentralization is conducive to mobilizing the enthusiasm and creativity of local governments, fully exploiting local resources and maximizing the capacity of local governance Play On the other hand, a high degree of centralization can easily discourage local innovation and weaken local administrative responsibilities, resulting in inefficient local administration. A high degree of decentralization also prevents local governments from obtaining effective support from the central government during the reform and issues such as lack of law and fiscal deficiencies . Through the United States (California) and Australia in dealing with urban wastewater recycling project measures to analyze the multi-level governance structure of the power structure of the reform efficiency. The research shows that in the two governance systems, the reform capability and the policy effect of the two regions are different when faced with the same barriers to reform and reform.