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在房地产项目的质量监管中,开发商、监理以及施工方由于经济利益诉求不同,构成了典型的博弈问题。将演化博弈理论引入到房地产项目质量监管问题中,构建了房地产项目质量监管的演化博弈模型,从理论上分析了模型解的稳定性及博弈参与方的策略选择行为。结果表明:房地产项目质量监管的演化博弈模型存在两个演化稳定点(1,0)和(0,0),施工方和监理方的策略选择与开发商的行为有着密切的关系。
In the quality supervision of real estate projects, developers, supervisors and construction parties, due to their different economic interests, constitute typical game problems. The evolutionary game theory is introduced into the quality supervision of real estate projects. The evolutionary game model of real estate project quality supervision is constructed. The stability of the model solution and the strategy selection behavior of game participants are analyzed theoretically. The results show that there are two stable evolution points (1,0) and (0,0) in the evolvement game model of real estate project quality supervision, and the strategy choice of construction party and supervisor is closely related to the behavior of developers.