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库存竞争性产品的需求依赖于该产品货架展示量.重点就VMI环境下经营库存竞争性产品的供应商和零售商的决策过程,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析.结果表明:当库存竞争性产品具有非库存弹性性质(即库存弹性系数小于1),需求的随机扰动因子为均匀分布时,存在唯一博弈均衡,使得分散式供应链双方最终达成收益分享合同;但该合同无法协调供应链,分散式系统的渠道期望收益始终低于集中式系统的渠道期望收益;与供应商相比,零售商享有更多的供应链渠道收益;利润率较低或者库存弹性较高的库存竞争性产品,更适宜在VMI环境下采用收益分享合同,进行分散的供应链管理.
The demand for inventory-competitive products depends on the amount of shelf-life of the products, and focuses on the modeling analysis of the decision-making process of suppliers and retailers running inventory-competitive products in VMI environment based on the Stackelberg game.The results show that when inventory is competitive When the product has a non-inventory elasticity (ie, the inventory elasticity is less than 1), and the stochastic perturbation factor of demand is uniformly distributed, there exists a unique game equilibrium, which eventually results in the revenue sharing contract between the two parties; however, the contract can not coordinate the supply chain, The expected revenue of the decentralized system’s channel is always lower than that of the centralized system’s channel; compared with the supplier, the retailer enjoys more channel benefits of the supply chain; competitive inventory with lower profit margin or higher inventory elasticity, More appropriate in the VMI environment using revenue sharing contracts for decentralized supply chain management.