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官员变更会引起企业投资支出的减少,然而,已有文献并未研究官员变更对外资专用性投资的影响。文章利用手工搜集的1997-2014年我国FDI结构的省际面板数据,考察了地方官员变更对外资专用性投资行为的影响。研究结果表明:地方官员变更引起辖区内政治不确定程度增加,显著地降低当年的外资专用性投资规模。相对于省委书记发生变更,省长发生变更对该地区外资专用性投资的影响更显著。与合资和合作两种利用外资形式相比,独资形式的外资专用性投资显然更易受到地方官员变更的负向影响。文章为不确定性与外资投资的研究提供了新的视角,并丰富了官员变更的相关文献。
However, there is no literature that examines the effect of official changes on the earmarked foreign investment. Using the hand-collected inter-provincial panel data of China’s FDI structure from 1997 to 2014, the article examines the impact of local officials’ changes on the specific investment behavior of foreign investment. The results show that the change of local officials caused the political uncertainties in the area to increase, significantly reducing the scale of the special foreign investment in that year. Relative to the provincial party secretary changed, the governor of the changes in the region’s foreign-funded investment more significantly. Compared with the two forms of foreign investment using joint ventures and cooperation, sole-funded foreign-funded specific investment is obviously more vulnerable to the negative impact of local officials’ changes. The article provides a new perspective for the study of uncertainty and foreign investment and enriches the relevant literature on official change.