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本文以控制权转移为背景,研究控制权私利攫取驱动下资本投向差异。结果表明,股权投资与控制权私利攫取负相关,固定资产及无形资产投资与私利攫取正相关。进一步研究发现:研发投入与国有公司大股东控制权私利攫取正相关;民营公司大股东通过股权投资提高控制权私利攫取水平;低市场化程度地区,大股东利用股权投资、固定资产及无形资产攫取私利水平显著下降;大股东利益侵占与未来公司业绩负相关,地方国有公司大股东利益侵占尤为严重。结果表明,在资本市场市场化程度日益加深的情况下,控制权私利攫取驱动资本投向差异,为引导政策性资源投入、完善资本市场秩序提供理论及经验支持。
This paper, with the transfer of control as the background, studies the difference of capital investment under the control of private interests. The result shows that the equity investment is negatively related to the self-interest grab of control, and the investment of fixed assets and intangible assets is positively correlated with the private gain. The further research shows that the R & D investment is positively related to the self-interest grabbing of the controlling shareholder of the state-owned company; the big shareholder of the private company improves the self-interest grabbing of the controlling right through the equity investment; in the low market area, the majority shareholders use the equity investment, fixed assets and intangible assets to seize The level of private profits dropped significantly; the major shareholders’ interests invaded and negatively correlated with the future performance of the company, and the interests of major shareholders of local state-owned companies were especially appropriated. The results show that under the circumstance of deepening marketization of capital market, the controlling interest self-interest seizes the difference of driving capital investment and provides theoretical and empirical support for guiding the input of policy resources and perfecting the capital market order.