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企业部分改制下的债务纠纷包含了两种完全不同的类型:债权僵局与恶意逃债。为化解债权僵局,立法上应要求改制企业与新设企业对原有债务共同承担责任。这一制度安排的内容表现为债务承担规则,但实质是一种事先的风险分配机制,而不是事后的救济措施。由于我国现行立法的空缺,司法实践客观上扮演了确立基本交易规则的角色。然而,因缺乏对债权僵局与恶意逃债的清晰界分,并受制于现实中恶意逃债现象的普遍性,司法实践与学理研究都滑向了单纯的债权人保护视角,忽略了基本交易规则与例外规则的区别。其结果是,破解改制债权僵局的基本制度安排始终未能建立起来,反欺诈规则被不适当地扩大适用,法官基于朴素认知在个案范围内实现的公平却冲击了整个司法秩序的统一,最终导致企业部分改制陷入纠纷不断、司法游移、论争不清的三重困境。
Debt disputes under the partial restructuring of enterprises contain two completely different types of debt deadlocks and malicious debt-evasion. In order to resolve the impasse of imposing debt, legislation should require the restructured enterprises and newly established enterprises to jointly assume their liabilities for the existing debts. The content of this institutional arrangement is manifested as a debt-bearing rule, but in essence it is an advance risk allocation mechanism rather than an ex post relief measure. Due to the vacancy of the current legislation in our country, judicial practice objectively plays the role of establishing the basic trading rules. However, due to the lack of a clear boundary between the impasse of claim and the evasion of malicious intent and the universality of the phenomenon of evading illegal debts in reality, both the judicial practice and the academic researches slide to the perspective of pure creditor protection, ignoring the basic transaction rules and exception rules The difference As a result, the basic institutional arrangements for cracking down the stalemate of the restructuring claims have not been established and the anti-fraud rules have been improperly extended and applied. The fairness achieved by the judges on a case-by-case basis based on simple perception has affected the unification of the entire judicial order and eventually Restructuring part of the enterprise led to constant disputes, judicial migration, the three dilemma of debate.