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如何降低经理人的逆向选择,解决“委托-代理”问题,是公司治理的核心问题。股权激励将经理人自身利益与广大股东权益有效地统一起来,避免经理人的短期行为,股票期权是实行股权激励的主要形式。本文运用代理理论从经理人激励角度建立经理人对企业剩余索取权分享模型,探讨了激励机制的激励结构、激励水平和激励实现机制等3个基本问题,并分析了我国上市公司实践股票期权存在的问题,提出了相关的政策建议。
How to reduce the adverse selection of managers and solve the problem of “principal-agent” is the core issue of corporate governance. Equity incentive effectively unifies the manager’s own interests with the shareholders’ rights and interests and avoids the manager’s short-term behavior. Stock option is the main form of equity incentive. This article uses the agency theory to establish manager’s share of the enterprise’s residual claim from the perspective of manager’s incentive, discusses the three basic problems of the incentive structure, incentive level and incentive mechanism, and analyzes the existence of the practice of the stock option The issue of the proposed policy recommendations.