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苏伊士之东 1956年,在纳赛尔的苏伊士运河国有化事件中,约旦、利比亚和斯里兰卡都拒绝英国使用位于其领土内的基地,英国军队深受其害。为减少对这些基地的依赖, 英国海军制定了发展由大型航母、护航舰只和支援补给舰支持的机动两栖特混舰队。这也意味着战后英国海军两大使命优先权的易位,表现在1957年防务评估书中,即建立满足欧洲之外的有限冲突作战要求的小型、专业、具有强大战略机动能力的军队。皇家海军和陆战队的价值被赋予了新的实现方式,“将和平时期保持的力量快速地投放到紧急而有限的作战行动中”,而评估书对海军在预想的欧洲大战中的角色则含糊其辞。事实上,1955年参谋部就已经意识到欧洲大战不太可能发生,国家机器应该为海外行动作准备,以“保持和提升大英帝国在冷战中的地位”。1956年6月参谋部同意将准备全面战争的优先权降至最低,而为“有限战争”或“冷战”的储备必须建立。
In 1956, in Nasser, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Jordan, Libya and Sri Lanka all refused to use British bases in their territories and the British army suffered a great deal. To reduce its dependence on these bases, the British Navy has devised a mobile amphibious task force that is backed by large carriers, escort ships and supportive supply ships. This also means the transliteration of the prerogative of the two naval missions after the war, as reflected in the 1957 Defense Review, the creation of small, professional, and strategically motivated forces that meet the requirements of limited-conflict operations outside Europe. The value of the Royal Navy and Marine Corps has been given new ways of “rapidly putting peacekeeping forces into immediate and limited combat operations” while the assessment book has a vague view of the Navy’s role in the predicted European war His words. In fact, in 1955 the staff had realized that the European war was unlikely to happen and that the state machine should prepare for overseas operations in order to “maintain and enhance the position of the British Empire in the Cold War.” In June 1956 the staff agreed to minimize the priority of preparations for a full-scale war and reserves for “limited war” or “cold war” must be established.