论文部分内容阅读
自1950年在GHQ的推动下日本商法导入股东诉讼代表制度后,又分别于1993年和2001年通过对商法中关于股东诉讼制度相关条款的修订进行了两次政策取向相反的改革,以2005年公司法成立为标志,形成了日本独特的股东代表诉讼制度,也成为了日本公司治理的重要手段之一。本文在阐释日本修订股东代表诉讼制度相关法律规定政策动力的同时,描述了具有不同使用成本的股东代表诉讼制度导致不同公司治理绩效的事实,试图利用交易成本理论对日本修订股东代表诉讼制度相关法律规定后具有不同使用成本的股东代表诉讼制度对公司治理的不同影响进行分析。
Since 1950, under the impetus of GHQ, Japanese commercial law introduced the shareholder representative system, and in 1993 and 2001, respectively, through the revision of the relevant provisions on the shareholder litigation system in commercial law, two changes were made to the contrary in policy orientation The incorporation of corporate law as a symbol has formed Japan’s unique shareholder representative litigation system and has also become one of the important means of corporate governance in Japan. In the meantime, this paper illustrates the policy motivation of Japan to amend the law of shareholder representative litigation and at the same time describes the fact that the shareholder representative litigation system with different cost of use leads to different corporate governance performance. This paper tries to use the transaction cost theory to review Japan’s law on shareholder representative litigation After the provisions of different cost of use of shareholder representative litigation system to analyze the different effects of corporate governance.