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采用博弈模型,以食品供应链所涉及的各个主体为博弈对象,针对质量投入、检查成本以及最终收益进行博弈分析,以期获得最终的博弈均衡解.结果表明:一定范围内的检查概率会使得供应链上游主体加大食品质量投入,但是过高的检查投入却会降低供应链整体效益水平和质量投入的积极性.此外,当考虑到质量投入带来的不同效益变化时,还会产生多种博弈均衡解.本文通过仿真给出最优的质量投入水平,在满足食品质量安全的前提下,使供应链整体效益最优.
This paper uses the game model to analyze the quality of inputs, inspection costs and final proceeds in order to get the final game equilibrium solution by the game players involved in the food supply chain.The results show that: within a certain range of inspection probability will make the supply However, excessive investment in inspection will reduce the overall efficiency of the supply chain and the enthusiasm of quality input.In addition, when taking into account the different benefits brought by quality investment, there will be a variety of games Equilibrium solution.This paper gives the best quality investment level through simulation and makes the best overall supply chain efficiency under the premise of meeting the food quality and safety.