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传统的武器装备保障是军方体制内的保障,供应商只负责提供装备,因而供应商没有动力提高装备可靠性,保障成本也比较高。针对这种弊端,本文提出了一种基于绩效的保障服务整体外包模式,即由供应商负责从提供装备到完成装备保障任务的整个供应链,军方根据保障的绩效水平通过合同进行一定的奖励和惩罚。本文运用委托代理的研究模型,分析了这种保障模式的优势。结果表明,军方一定的激励政策可以引导供应商努力提高装备可靠性,并使其获得更好的收入;与此同时,军方保障的总成本也得到降低,供应链绩效得到改善。
The traditional weapon and equipment support is the guarantee within the military system. The supplier is only responsible for providing the equipment. Therefore, the supplier has no incentive to improve the equipment reliability and the guarantee cost is relatively high. In view of this drawback, this paper presents a performance-based overall service outsourcing model, in which the supplier is responsible for providing the equipment to complete the supply chain to complete the task of equipment support. The military rewards certain awards through contracts according to the guaranteed performance level And punishment. This paper uses the research model of principal-agent, and analyzes the advantages of this mode. The results show that the military’s certain incentive policies can guide suppliers to strive to improve equipment reliability and enable them to obtain better incomes. At the same time, the total cost of military support is also reduced, and the performance of supply chain is improved.