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通过利用空间面板Durbi n模型,实证检验了中国省及省以下财政分权对财政支出偏向政策的影响。研究发现,总体上,省级财政分权促使地方政府增加了基本建设性支出比重,而减少了社会发展性支出的比重,省以下财政分权对财政支出结构效应则正好相反。相邻地区GDP增长率的提高,促使地方政府增加基本建设性支出比重,而降低社会发展性支出比重。地方政府在财政支出竞争上同时出现了攀比效应和逐底竞争效应。因此,纠正地方政府支出偏向政策,必须推动政府绩效考评体系改革和财政体制改革。
By using the Durbi n model of spatial panel, this paper empirically tests the influence of fiscal decentralization on fiscal expenditure biased policies in China and below provinces. The study found that, on the whole, the provincial fiscal decentralization prompted local governments to increase the proportion of capital expenditures for basic construction while reducing the proportion of social development expenditures. The fiscal decentralization below the provincial level has the opposite effect on the structure of fiscal expenditures. The increase of GDP growth rate in neighboring areas has prompted local governments to increase the proportion of capital expenditures and reduce the proportion of social development expenditures. Local governments have both the competition effect and the competition by competition effect on the competition of fiscal expenditure. Therefore, to correct the local government expenditure bias policy, we must promote the reform of the government performance appraisal system and the reform of the financial system.