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蓄意致灾事件的应急决策往往是在信息不对称的复杂情景下进行的,研究应急信息策略对辅助应急决策具有重要意义。该文考虑蓄意致灾者和应急决策者的决策相互作用,建立动态不完全信息博弈模型描述双方冲突,讨论了资源约束和信息成本对均衡的影响,并利用基于主体的仿真进行了验证。结果表明:信息策略在很大程度上影响致灾者的行动选择;应急决策者通过合理的策略隐藏关键信息,能够有效降低期望损失。应急决策者可以通过“情景—学习—应对”的决策模式获得最优策略,实现对蓄意致灾事件的有效诱导和干预。
The emergency decision-making of deliberately causing the disaster is often carried out under the complex situation of asymmetric information. Studying the emergency information strategy is of great significance to assist emergency decision-making. This paper considers the decision-making interaction between deliberate victims and emergency decision-makers and establishes dynamic incomplete game theory to describe the conflict between the two parties. The impact of resource constraints and information costs on the equilibrium is discussed, and the verification based on the subject-based simulation is carried out. The results show that the information strategy has a great influence on the disaster victims’ choice of action; and the emergency decision-makers hide the key information through reasonable strategies, which can effectively reduce the expected loss. Emergency decision-makers can obtain the optimal strategy through the decision-making model of “Scenario-Learning-Response” to realize the effective induction and intervention of deliberately causing the disaster.