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基于分权治理和软预算约束研究文献构造区域产出模型和地方政府竞争决策函数,利用中国改革后31个省份的面板数据和OLS、GMM估计方法,研究得出:由于软预算约束,地方政府在经济增长压力、政绩排名和权力优越感的竞争驱动下,无论经济繁荣或萧条,都具有投资扩张倾向,表现为权力控制内的财政支出扩张和权力控制外的行政争夺银行信贷、过度优惠引进FDI,并通过倒逼机制引致货币供给增加。地方政府的扩张行为在资源未充分利用时具有推动经济增长、物价上浮的经济效应,但同时也是加剧区域收入差距的重要原因之一。
Based on the literature of decentralized governance and soft budget constraints, the paper constructs the regional output model and the local government competitive decision function. Using panel data and OLS and GMM estimation methods in 31 provinces after China’s reform, we find that due to soft budget constraints, local governments Driven by the pressures of economic growth, political performance ranking and the sense of superiority of power, both have the tendency of investment expansion regardless of the economic prosperity or depression, which is manifested in the expansion of administrative expenditure within the power control and the control of banks outside power control. Credit over-introduction FDI, and through the Forced mechanism led to an increase in money supply. The expansion of local government has the economic effect of promoting economic growth and price inflation when resources are underutilized, but it is also one of the important reasons for increasing regional income disparity.