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中国加入WTO相关文件中的特定产品过渡性保障机制是一种歧视性的、变相的“灰色领域措施”。它在WTO法律体系中的合法性和有效性在理论上是存在争议的。既然WTO法律体系中协定或规范之间存在明确的等级关系,当载有特保条款的中国入世法律文件与WTO协定和多边贸易协定发生抵触时,理应适用上位法优先规则。特保条款在实践中的不合理性显而易见,其症结是中国的市场经济地位问题。在国际社会对市场经济尚缺乏统一界定的情况下,任何单方面的国内标准难免有失公平、公正和合理。随着中国社会主义市场经济体制的完善和越来越多的WTO成员的认可,针对中国的特保条款似乎存在着提前终止的可能性,尽管具有相当大的难度。
The transitional guarantee mechanism for specific products in the documents related to China’s accession to the WTO is a discriminatory and disguised “gray area measure.” Its legitimacy and validity in the WTO legal system are theoretically controversial. Since there is a clear hierarchical relationship between the agreements or norms in the legal system of WTO, when China’s accession law documents containing special safeguard clauses conflict with WTO agreements and multilateral trade agreements, the rules of prioritization of supervisors should be applied. The unreasonableness of the special safeguard clause in practice is obvious. The crux of the problem is China’s market economy status. In the absence of a unified definition of the market economy by the international community, it is inevitable that any unilateral domestic standard will be unfair, fair and reasonable. With the improvement of China’s socialist market economic system and the recognition of more and more WTO members, there appears to be a possibility of an early termination of the special safeguard clause against China, albeit with considerable difficulty.