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基金经理运用声誉及信息操纵来获得超额利润的现象频发已严重阻碍了中国证券市场的健康发展,因此明晰其中的博弈演化机理以减少基金经理道德风险的发生具有较高的研究价值。本文通过数理模型从声誉及信息操纵两个维度研究了基金经理持股策略演化博弈过程。研究发现,如果非明星基金经理树立声誉的净收益大于市场平均收益,那么经过长期演化博弈,具有有限理性的明星基金经理选择继续维护声誉策略,非明星基金经理选择建立声誉策略。当强势明星基金经理信息操纵的收益小于信息操纵的成本时,无论外部投资者是否监督,有限理性的强势明星基金经理均会选择如实披露信息的策略。当外部投资者监督的收益小于监督的成本时,外部投资者选择不监督策略;当外部投资者监督的收益大于监督的成本时,外部投资者的策略选择依赖于强势明星基金经理的策略选择,强势明星基金经理选择信息操纵策略的概率越大,外部投资者越可能选择监督策略。
The frequent occurrence of excessive profit by reputation and information manipulations by fund managers has seriously hindered the healthy development of China’s securities market. Therefore, it is of high research value to clarify the mechanism of game evolution so as to reduce the moral hazard of fund managers. This paper studies the evolutionary process of fund managers’share strategy from the two dimensions of reputation and information manipulation through mathematical model. The result shows that if the non-star fund manager’s reputation of net income is greater than the average return of the market, the star manager with limited rationality will choose to maintain the reputation strategy through long-term evolutionary game, and the non-star fund manager chooses to establish the reputation strategy. When the benefits of information manipulation by powerful star fund managers are less than the cost of information manipulation, powerful bosses with limited rationality will choose a strategy of truthfully disclosing their information, regardless of whether the outside investors supervise. External investors choose not to supervise the strategy when the profit monitored by external investors is less than the cost of supervising. When the profit monitored by external investors is greater than the cost of supervising, the strategic choice of external investors depends on the strategic choice of the powerful star fund managers, The greater the probability that a strong star fund manager chooses to manipulate strategy, the more likely it is for outside investors to choose a strategy.