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本文以我国2008~2016年间A股主板的非金融上市公司作为研究样本,考察经理人股权激励对企业零负债行为的影响,以及货币政策变动对以上关系的调节作用。本文的研究结果显示:相较于无股权激励企业,股权激励企业的零负债概率更低;经理人较高的股权激励强度反而会降低企业零负债的可能性;趋严的货币政策会强化经理人股权激励对企业零负债概率的影响。
This paper takes the non-financial listed companies of A-share companies in China from 2008 to 2016 as the research sample to examine the impact of manager’s equity incentive on the corporate zero-liability behavior and the regulatory effect of the change of monetary policy on the above relationship. The result of this paper shows that the probability of zero-debt of equity-motivated firms is lower than that of non-equity-motivated firms, and the higher stock option incentive intensity of managers may reduce the possibility of zero debt. Tighter monetary policy will strengthen managers The Impact of Human Share Incentives on the Probability of Enterprise Zero Indebtedness.