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通过对国家级贫困县A县竞争性扶贫项目运作逻辑的探析发现,依附于科层制之下的扶贫项目在实施前的选择性平衡,实施中的反科层制逻辑以及落地后的短期效应共同造成项目制在扶贫开发中功能的式微。扶贫项目在地方实践中的非均衡分配规制了贫困地区脱贫的步伐,项目进村时呈现出的“委托-代理”关系使地方在扶贫项目打包中以“反控制”的策略从中谋利,项目制“短、平、快”的目标导向弱化了扶贫开发的可持续性。面对扶贫项目存在的一系列问题,需要进一步加强项目执行的监管力度,提高基层政府的精准扶贫治理能力,制定扶贫开发的后续扶持政策。
Through the analysis of the operational logic of the competitive poverty alleviation project in A county in the national poverty-stricken counties, it is found that the selective balance before the implementation of the poverty alleviation projects attached to the bureaucracy, the anti-bureaucratic logic in implementation and the short-term effect after landing Together to cause the project system in poverty alleviation and development functions of the micro. The unbalanced distribution of poverty alleviation projects in local practices regulates the pace of alleviating poverty in poor areas. The “commission-agency” relationship that emerged during the project’s entry into the village helped the localities to profit from the “anti-control” strategy of packaging poverty alleviation projects. The project The goal-oriented “short, flat and fast” has weakened the sustainability of poverty alleviation and development. In the face of a series of problems in poverty alleviation projects, we need to further strengthen the supervision of project implementation, raise the grassroots-level government’s ability to accurately manage poverty and formulate follow-up supportive policies for poverty alleviation and development.