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在金字塔控股结构下,以中国制造业上市公司2007~2013年的数据为样本,检验不同类型的终极股东对上市公司的利益侵占行为,以及不同类型的债务融资工具在侵占行为中的调节作用。结果表明:中央及地方政府控股股东对上市公司有支持行为,家族控股股东对上市公司有侵占行为;商业信用削弱了中央政府控股股东的支持行为,银行债务和公司债券削弱了地方政府控股股东的支持行为,银行债务和商业信用加剧了家族控股股东的侵占行为。
Under the pyramid holding structure, taking the data of Chinese manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as a sample, it tests the interests encroachment of listed companies by different types of ultimate shareholders and the regulatory role of different types of debt financing instruments in encroachment. The results show that the controlling shareholders of the central and local governments have supportive behavior to the listed companies and the controlling shareholders of the family have the appropriation of the listed companies. The commercial credit has weakened the support from the controlling shareholders of the central government. The bank debt and the corporate bonds have weakened the controlling shareholder of the local government Supporting behavior, bank debt and commercial credit exacerbated the embezzlement by family-controlling shareholders.