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著名经济学家樊纲认为,1998年宏观政策虽然已不再是信贷紧缩,但实际生活中却出现了“信贷萎缩”(指由信贷双方“惜贷”和“惜借”所造成的信贷活动不活跃的现象)。1998年1-11月,银行贷款余额的增长率为17％,略高于1997年的16.7％,但仍大大低于1996年的21.2％和1995年的24.1％。如果扣除1998年大量增加的对国家基础设施投资项目的贷款,贷款总额的增长率可以说是下降的。这种“信贷萎缩”正是中国经济在1998年难以快速回升的重要原因之一。 樊纲概括了引起信贷萎缩的几个因素:(1)国有企业坏债比重很高,银行已难以再对其进行贷款;(2)国有
Fan Gang, a famous economist, thinks that although the macroeconomic policy was no longer a credit crunch in 1998, “credit shrinkage” appeared in real life (referring to credit activities caused by “loaning” and “loaning” loans by both sides of credit Active phenomenon). From January to November 1998, the growth rate of bank loan balance was 17%, slightly higher than the 16.7% in 1997, but still much lower than the 21.2% in 1996 and 24.1% in 1995. If we deduct the substantial increase in loans to national infrastructure investment projects in 1998, the growth rate of the total loans can be said to have dropped. This “credit contraction” is one of the important reasons why China’s economy is hard to recover rapidly in 1998. Fan Gang summarized several factors that led to the credit crunch: (1) the proportion of bad debts in state-owned enterprises was high, and it was hard for banks to lend them any more; (2) the state-owned