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本文首先研究我国微型企业融资的制约因素,然后从经济学角度,运用信息不对称理论,建立动态博弈模型,从无外部风险分担和有外部风险分担两种情况,研究我国微型企业信贷风险的化解机制,研究发现:采取高利率来补偿微型企业信贷风险并不具有广泛的可行性,建立有效的外部机制对微型企业信贷的开展非常关键,最后提出了化解微型企业信贷风险的政策建议。
This paper first studies the restrictive factors of micro-enterprise financing in our country, then uses the information asymmetry theory to establish the dynamic game model from the perspective of economics and studies the dissolution of micro-enterprise credit risk in our country from two aspects: no external risk sharing and external risk sharing Mechanism, the study found that adopting high interest rates to compensate for the credit risk of micro-enterprises is not widely feasible and establishing an effective external mechanism is very crucial for the development of micro-enterprises’ credit. Finally, some policy suggestions are put forward to solve the credit risk of micro-enterprises.