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在所有权与经营权分离状态下,由于委托人和代理人之间信息不对称、利益不一致、责任不对等而使委托—代理制度出现新的问题。随着新问题的出现,如何对代理人进行有效监督便成为一个必须认真解决的重要问题,在我国社会主义制度下也是如此。 经过二十余年的改革,我国国有企业的整体状况有了较大的改观,但是一些深层次的问题仍没有解决,其中最突出的问题之一就是国有资产所有者的权益得不到有效的保护,国有资产流失严重。国有资产的流失与国有企业改革的路径选择密切相关,国有企业改革的路径依赖性与改革过程的不可逆性造成了企业经营者行为失控。1998年国家出台稽察特派员制
In the state of separation of ownership and management rights, due to information asymmetry, inconsistent interests, and unequal responsibilities between the principal and the agent, new problems arise in the principal-agent system. With the emergence of new problems, how to effectively supervise agents has become an important issue that must be seriously addressed. This is also true in our socialist system. After more than two decades of reforms, the overall state of our state-owned enterprises has been greatly improved, but some deep-seated problems have still not been resolved. One of the most prominent problems is that the rights and interests of state-owned assets owners are not effectively Protection, serious loss of state-owned assets. The loss of state-owned assets is closely related to the choice of path for the reform of state-owned enterprises. The path dependence of the reform of state-owned enterprises and the irreversibility of the reform process have caused the behavior of business operators to get out of control. In 1998, the State issued a special system for inspectors