论文部分内容阅读
Oregon’s comprehensive land-use planning program has been in effect for nearly 40 years, but the battle between supporters of the planning system and property rights advocates continues. Driven by both economic and social incentives, groups on both sides of the issue continue to push their agendas. Property rights advocates fight for reduced regulation and claim that comprehensive land-use regulation hurts property values and slows development activity. Planning advocates argue that the benefits of comprehensive planning outweigh the burdens, and that smart planning actually increases property values and protects the environment. This article explores both sides of the comprehensive land-use planning debate through the unbiased lens of economic analysis. We conclude that while the Oregon system is not perfect, Oregon’s experiment with comprehensive planning regulation has been a success. Property values in Oregon have risen steadily, and in general, have outperformed neighboring states, which have been slower to adopt comprehensive planning regulation.
relationship”.26 A classic example of an externality is when a neighboring property owner constructs a building that blocks the view of an adjacent property owner. With no legal method to stop the construction, the adjacent property owner bears the cost of the devaluation of his land, even though he was not a party to the transaction. This is an example of a negative externality.27 If, for example, the neighboring property owner built a fancy golf course and resort, this could be a positive externality. Some economists have described positive externalities as “amenities”, which can actually increase the value of neighboring property.28
The tort theory of nuisance could provide relief for negative externalities, but most jurisdictions have chosen to codify these nuisancebased rules in what we know today as land-use regulation. Government intervention is necessary because “totally private ordering of land use decision making through market mechanisms is not a realistic option”.29 We now have local ordinances to protect view sheds and restrictions on building height and even design and color. When a neighboring property owner puts his land into an incompatible use, such as a feedlot, or a heavy industrial use in a residential area, he is imposing a negative externality on adjacent landowners. Before land-use restrictions, the residential landowners were forced to sue in tort under a nuisance theory.
C. Why Do We Regulate?
In economic terms, the reason we regulate these negative externalities is to prevent market failures. “A market failure is a situation where the private market fails to produce the optimal level of a particular good.”30 An externality is a form of market failure, because it represents the costs to a third party that were not considered in a private transaction. Id. In our previous transaction, one property owner constructed a home, presumably because it was in his best interest to do so. The adjacent property owner, however, had no choice in the matter and lost value in his property as a result. Economic theory presumes that market failures are a net loss for the market as a whole, and for that reason, government intervention is proper, and can benefit the market. Id. It can be very difficult, however, to create a
winners and losers. The winners reaped huge rewards by taking advantage of the economic effects of scarcity and amenity, while still being compensated for their alleged loss in property value. The losers suffered the loss associated with diminished scarcity and amenity effects.
A system of exemptions based on length of ownership creates a checkerboard pattern of land-use regulations.61 Eventually, Oregon voters came to their senses and approved Measure 49, which sharply curtailed the broad exemptions allowed by Measure 37, but still left plenty of room for individual exemptions to land-use regulation. This brief summary of the effects of Measures 37 and 49 is in no way intended to be exhaustive, as volumes of work have been written on the subject alone. The important lesson to take from this discussion of the Measures 37 and 49 is that the true economic effects of legislation often play a much smaller role than they should in the minds of voters.
Despite the uproar from property rights groups and landowners wishing to make their millions in the real estate market, Oregon’s land-use planning system appears to have accomplished many of its originally stated goals. Property values in Oregon are higher than those in Washington, and those who are truly hurt by comprehensive planning regulation are in the minority.62 In general, the benefits of smart planning outweigh the burdens. If our experiences with Measures 37 and 49 have taught us anything though, it is that Oregon’s planning system is not invulnerable to attack. Those who wish to influence the masses need only to appeal to voter’s economic incentives and craft a message that Oregon voters want to hear. The battle over Oregon’s land-use regulation system continues, even today. Those in favor of comprehensive planning regulation must continue to educate the public and expose misleading information if we are to avoid another Measure 37 style campaign. The opposition to comprehensive planning is a small, but at times, powerful group. Understanding their motivations and incentives will help to preserve Oregon’s planning program and continue to let Oregon “twinkle from afar.”63
relationship”.26 A classic example of an externality is when a neighboring property owner constructs a building that blocks the view of an adjacent property owner. With no legal method to stop the construction, the adjacent property owner bears the cost of the devaluation of his land, even though he was not a party to the transaction. This is an example of a negative externality.27 If, for example, the neighboring property owner built a fancy golf course and resort, this could be a positive externality. Some economists have described positive externalities as “amenities”, which can actually increase the value of neighboring property.28
The tort theory of nuisance could provide relief for negative externalities, but most jurisdictions have chosen to codify these nuisancebased rules in what we know today as land-use regulation. Government intervention is necessary because “totally private ordering of land use decision making through market mechanisms is not a realistic option”.29 We now have local ordinances to protect view sheds and restrictions on building height and even design and color. When a neighboring property owner puts his land into an incompatible use, such as a feedlot, or a heavy industrial use in a residential area, he is imposing a negative externality on adjacent landowners. Before land-use restrictions, the residential landowners were forced to sue in tort under a nuisance theory.
C. Why Do We Regulate?
In economic terms, the reason we regulate these negative externalities is to prevent market failures. “A market failure is a situation where the private market fails to produce the optimal level of a particular good.”30 An externality is a form of market failure, because it represents the costs to a third party that were not considered in a private transaction. Id. In our previous transaction, one property owner constructed a home, presumably because it was in his best interest to do so. The adjacent property owner, however, had no choice in the matter and lost value in his property as a result. Economic theory presumes that market failures are a net loss for the market as a whole, and for that reason, government intervention is proper, and can benefit the market. Id. It can be very difficult, however, to create a
winners and losers. The winners reaped huge rewards by taking advantage of the economic effects of scarcity and amenity, while still being compensated for their alleged loss in property value. The losers suffered the loss associated with diminished scarcity and amenity effects.
A system of exemptions based on length of ownership creates a checkerboard pattern of land-use regulations.61 Eventually, Oregon voters came to their senses and approved Measure 49, which sharply curtailed the broad exemptions allowed by Measure 37, but still left plenty of room for individual exemptions to land-use regulation. This brief summary of the effects of Measures 37 and 49 is in no way intended to be exhaustive, as volumes of work have been written on the subject alone. The important lesson to take from this discussion of the Measures 37 and 49 is that the true economic effects of legislation often play a much smaller role than they should in the minds of voters.
Despite the uproar from property rights groups and landowners wishing to make their millions in the real estate market, Oregon’s land-use planning system appears to have accomplished many of its originally stated goals. Property values in Oregon are higher than those in Washington, and those who are truly hurt by comprehensive planning regulation are in the minority.62 In general, the benefits of smart planning outweigh the burdens. If our experiences with Measures 37 and 49 have taught us anything though, it is that Oregon’s planning system is not invulnerable to attack. Those who wish to influence the masses need only to appeal to voter’s economic incentives and craft a message that Oregon voters want to hear. The battle over Oregon’s land-use regulation system continues, even today. Those in favor of comprehensive planning regulation must continue to educate the public and expose misleading information if we are to avoid another Measure 37 style campaign. The opposition to comprehensive planning is a small, but at times, powerful group. Understanding their motivations and incentives will help to preserve Oregon’s planning program and continue to let Oregon “twinkle from afar.”63