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通过政府与国内非法、合法资本持有者间的不完美信息动态博弈模型,得出政府对待非法资本的严厉打击,将在一定程度上引起国内整体性的跟随性流出。即政府对待非法资本的态度,将在一定程度上影响我国资本净流出/流入的方向。而国内存在大量资本净流入时,相当于放宽了政府对非法资本的严厉打击的现实约束,为在资本净流量波动尽量小的前提下改善经济运行环境创造了条件。
Through the imperfect information dynamic game model between the government and the domestic illegal and legitimate capital holders, it is concluded that the government crackdown on illegal capital will, to a certain extent, lead to the follow-up of the whole country. That is, the attitude of the government towards illicit capital will to a certain extent affect the direction of China’s net capital outflow / inflow. When there is a large net inflow of capital in China, it is equivalent to relaxing the current government constraint on the crackdown on illicit capital and creating conditions for improving the environment for economic operation on the premise of minimizing fluctuations in net capital flows.