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生态移民是当前的一个社会热点问题。文章将政府政策视为外生变量,从非理性人假设出发,构建进化博弈模型探索农户在生态移民搬迁过程中的群体行为进化规律。研究结果表明:农户存在多个进化稳定策略的可能,最终的进化稳定策略取决于搬迁农户的预期收益、因搬迁造成的实物资本损失以及非搬迁户的预期社会资本损失。因此,生态移民搬迁过程中政府部门应着重提高搬迁后农户收益水平,同时降低农户搬迁成本,以促进工程的顺利进行。
Ecological immigration is currently a social hot issue. The article regards the government policy as exogenous variable. Based on the assumption of non-rational people, the article constructs the evolutionary game model and explores the evolution rules of the group behavior of peasant households in the process of ecological migration. The results show that there are many evolutionary stabilization strategies for peasant households. The final strategy of evolutionary stability depends on the expected return of peasants, the loss of physical capital due to relocation and the expected loss of social capital of non-relocated households. Therefore, during the relocation of ecological migrants, the government departments should focus on improving the income level of farmers after relocation and at the same time reduce the relocation costs of farmers so as to promote the smooth progress of the project.