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以采购问题为背景研究多属性拍卖问题,其中拍卖问题的特点是:(1)包含任意有限个属性;(2)买卖双方的效用函数均具有加性结构,且在除价格以外的单个属性上,买方的效用函数和卖方的成本函数均为一般幂函数形式。首先,设计了一种买方事先公布评分函数而卖方轮流提交投标的多属性英式拍卖机制;其次,在卖方对称的假设下分析了拍卖机制中的最优投标策略,确定了最优投标价格和最优非价格属性值;然后,分析得出了最具成本优势的卖方最终胜出的条件以及最优多属性投标;最后,计算了该拍卖机制中买方的期望收益,并求出了使其期望收益最大化的最优评分函数权重。
The problem of multi-attribute auction is studied on the basis of purchasing problem. The characteristics of the auction problem are as follows: (1) it contains any finite number of attributes; (2) the utility function of both buyer and seller has an additive structure, and on a single attribute other than the price , The buyer’s utility function and the seller’s cost function are all general power functions. First, we design a multi-attribute British auction mechanism in which the buyer publishes the bidding function in advance and the seller submits the bidding by turns. Secondly, under the assumption of the symmetry of the seller, the optimal bidding strategy in the auction mechanism is analyzed, and the optimal bidding price and The optimal non-price property value is obtained. Then, the seller’s condition of winning the most cost advantage and the optimal multi-attribute bidding are obtained. Finally, the expected return of the buyer in the auctioning system is calculated and the expectation The Best Score Function Weight for Maximizing Revenue.