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自詹森和麦克林提出代理成本理论以来,理论界对代理成本理论的研究,全部集中在股东与经理之间的股权代理成本和股东与债权人之间的债权代理成本。而关于经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题,几乎是空白。本文通过对经理作为“合同收益者”与“剩余收益者”双重属性的分析,提出了关于经理和债权人之间代理成本问题研究的基本思路。
Since Janssen and Macklin proposed the theory of agency costs, the theoretical circle of agency theory has been focused on the agency costs between shareholders and managers and the agency costs between shareholders and creditors. The issue of agency costs between managers and creditors is almost empty. By analyzing managers’ double attributes of “contract beneficiaries” and “residual income earners”, this paper puts forward the basic idea of the research on agency costs among managers and creditors.