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本文通过实证分析探讨了股票误定价对公司管理层盈余预测决策的影响,发现股票误定价程度越高,公司越倾向于发布管理层盈余预测。这表明股票误定价程度较高的公司,具有强烈动机通过发布管理层盈余预测纠正或延长误定价。本文的研究结论对完善我国上市公司的管理层自愿披露盈余预测制度和股票定价机制具有一定的参考价值。
This paper explores the impact of mispricing on the management’s earnings forecasting decision-making by empirical analysis, and finds that the higher the price of mispricing, the more inclined the company is to release management’s earnings forecast. This shows that companies with higher false equity prices have a strong incentive to correct or extend false pricing by issuing management’s earnings forecasts. The conclusion of this paper is of certain reference value for improving the management’s voluntary disclosure disclosure forecast system and stock pricing mechanism of listed companies in our country.