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本文运用西班牙电力市场的实际数据对统一出清价格机制进行实证分析,结论指出在该机制下发电公司要实施市场力行为抬高报价,从而降低了电力市场的效率,使得该机制下市场的社会福利较低。根据这一结论,本文提出应设计一种新的价格机制替代统一出清价格机制,抑制发电公司实施市场力抬高报价的行为。
This paper uses the real data of the Spanish electricity market to make an empirical analysis of the uniform pricing mechanism. The conclusion shows that under this mechanism, the electricity generation company should enforce the market power behavior to raise the quotation, thus reducing the efficiency of the electricity market and making the market under the mechanism social Welfare is low. According to this conclusion, this paper proposes that a new pricing mechanism should be designed instead of a unified pricing mechanism to curb the implementation of market power by generating companies.