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由于集群企业距离近,创新扩散快,创新外部性强,致使非创新企业“搭便车”现象严重,创新失灵现象突出。与其放任创新失灵,不如设计一套机制,以利益补偿为纽带,对创新主体进行有效的利益补偿,实现既治理创新失灵又促进创新效率提高的目的。考虑企业集群的技术能力呈现一种非均衡的分布及技术溢出的单向性,引入了溢出效应和创新效率两个变量,建立了潜在率先创新企业和模仿企业间的斯坦伯格博弈模型,分析了创新失灵的经济根源,阐述了技术溢出和创新能力对创新失灵的影响过程,提出了基于知识共享机制的治理创新失灵方式,给出了设置知识共享机制的政策建议。
Due to the proximity of cluster companies, the rapid diffusion of innovation and the strong externalities of innovation, the phenomenon of non-innovative enterprises “free riders” is serious, and the phenomenon of innovation failure is prominent. Instead of letting innovations fail, it is better to design a set of mechanisms and use interest compensation as a link to effectively compensate for the main body of innovation and achieve the goal of not only managing failure but also promoting innovation efficiency. Considering that the technological capabilities of enterprise clusters present a non-equilibrium distribution and unidirectionality of technological spillover, two variables, spillover effect and innovation efficiency, have been introduced, and the Steinberger game model between potential innovative companies and imitation companies has been established. The economic roots of innovation failure are described. The process of technology spillovers and innovations’ impact on innovation failures is described. The failure of governance innovation based on knowledge sharing mechanism is proposed, and the policy recommendations for setting up knowledge sharing mechanisms are given.