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事前的信息择时披露和事后对授予日、行权日择时的倒签等高管寻租行为可能导致股权激励失效,但我国的有关文献却非常缺乏,特别是对作为股权激励主要方式之一的股票期权的倒签行为鲜有研究。本文系统回顾了西方研究中的相关文献,分析了股权激励契约的授予日、行权日的择时或倒签行为,在此基础上结合我国股权激励制度及配套的税收制度深入分析了高管在股票期权激励计划披露、行权、出售等关键环节的择时行为的动机及其实现机理。本文对中国上市公司的股权激励方案设计、监管层的股权激励相关配套制度的完善提供了重要的启示,拓宽了股权激励中高管寻租行为的研究视角和内容。
Ex ante information disclosure and post-grant on the grant date, the exercise of the right to choose the time to sign up and other executive rent-seeking behavior may lead to the failure of equity incentives, but our country’s relevant literature is very scarce, especially as the main method of equity incentive There is little research on the backdating behavior of a stock option. This paper systematically reviews the relevant literature in the western studies, analyzes the grant date of stock incentive contract, the timing of the exercise date, or the act of rewinding. On the basis of this, it analyzes in depth the relationship between executive incentive Motivation and implementation mechanism of timing behavior in key aspects such as disclosure, exercise and sale of stock option incentive plan. This article provides an important enlightenment for the design of equity incentive plan of listed companies in China and the perfection of relevant supporting system of equity incentive for regulators, and broadens the research perspective and content of senior executives’ rent-seeking behavior in equity incentive.