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企业需要经理股票期权现代企业制度的一个重要特征就是它实现了所有权与经营权的分离。在“两权分离”的情况下,企业股东与经理之间就存在着“委托-代理”的合同关系,这种“合同”不仅是指聘书所代表的“显性”的合同关系,而且也是指股东与经理之间在一些无法观察到的问题上的“隐性”的合同关系。这些难以观察的变量包括经理人员的努力程度、对公司资产的关联程度以及对股东利益(短期的和长期的)的某种关心和追求方式以及信息的利用等。这些“隐性变量”构成了代理成本的主要部分。委托-代理理论告诉我们,降低代理成本的一个有效途径就是把经理的个
Enterprises need manager stock options An important feature of the modern enterprise system is that it realizes the separation of ownership and management rights. In the case of “separation of ownership”, there is a “commission-agent” contractual relationship between corporate shareholders and managers. This “contract” not only refers to the “dominant” contractual relationship represented by the letter of offer, but also Refers to the “hidden” contractual relationship between shareholders and managers on some unobservable issues. These unobservable variables include the level of effort on the part of the manager, the degree of connection to the company's assets, and the way in which shareholders' interests (both short-term and long-term) are expressed and pursued, and the use of information. These “hidden variables” constitute a major part of the agency costs. Trust-agent theory tells us that an effective way to reduce agency costs is to put the manager's