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以控制权收益理论为基础,构建跨期投资下的控股股东两期利益侵占模型,研究现金流权比例、远期投资收益率和股东法律保护力度对控制权私利的影响.结果表明:现金流权比例、股东法律保护力度与控股股东的即期和远期最优侵占水平均负相关;远期投资收益率与控股股东的即期最优侵占水平负相关,但与远期最优侵占水平无关;控股股东在两期侵占中的即期最优侵占水平低于其单期侵占中的即期最优侵占水平,远期最优侵占水平则保持不变;控股股东非短视,其终极目标是实现控制权私利的长期收益最大化,而获取控制权长期收益最大化也是导致其两期侵占行为发生的主要原因.
Based on the theory of control return, this paper constructs two models of interests encroachment of controlling shareholders under intertemporal investment, and studies the influence of cash flow right ratio, forward return rate and shareholders’ legal protection on the private benefit of control. The results show that cash flow The ratio of shareholders’ rights and the legal protection of shareholders are negatively correlated with the immediate and long-term optimal levels of occupation of controlling shareholders. The long-term return on investment is negatively related to the immediate optimal level of occupation of controlling shareholders, The controlling shareholder’s optimal instantaneous invasion level in the two periods of invasion and occupation is lower than the spot immediate optimal invasion and occupation level in the period of temporary invasion and the optimal occupancy level in the long run remains unchanged. The controlling shareholder’s non-short-sightedness has its ultimate goal Is to maximize the long-term benefits of private ownership of control, and to maximize the long-term gain of control is also the main reason that led to its two phases of encroachment.