论文部分内容阅读
自来水供给属于城市公用事业之一,具有自然垄断性和公益性。在近代上海,英商上海自来水公司和上海公共租界工部局分别以特许权协议为基础进行公司经营和公共部门监管。自1928年双方重新签订特许权协议,至1942年工部局批准以日伪中储券征收水费之前的这段时期,水费以上涨为主,其间经历两次下调,工部局的水费监管包括干预价格和管制利润两个方面。水费调整通过附加费、折扣率和基本费率的变动来实现,通常由公司提出申请,递交工部局审批。不同的社会团体也在水费调整中以各自的立场表达着不同的观点和主张,工部局也曾引入第三方对公司进行调查。在水费监管中,工部局在增进社会福利和促进社会公平方面有所作为,在鼓励市场竞争方面比较薄弱。此外需注意,协议中对应付股利的规定未必一定形成对公司获利行为的一种约束,也有可能形成对公司股东利益的一种维护。
Water supply is one of the city’s public utilities, with natural monopoly and public welfare. In modern Shanghai, the British Shanghai Waterworks Company and the Shanghai Public Settlement Bureau respectively set up the company operation and public sector supervision based on the concession agreement. Since 1928, the two parties re-signed the concession agreement until the approval of the MPS in 1942, before the water charges were collected from the securities of the Puppet Government in Japan. The water charges rose mainly, with two reductions in the meantime, Including intervention in prices and regulatory profits in two aspects. Water charges are adjusted through changes in surcharges, discount rates and base rates, which are usually applied by companies and submitted to the MOB for approval. Different social groups also expressed different opinions and propositions on their respective positions in the adjustment of water charges. The Bureau of Industry and Migration also introduced a third party to investigate the company. In the regulation of water fees, the MIBB has made a difference in promoting social welfare and promoting social fairness, and is relatively weak in encouraging market competition. In addition, it should be noted that the provisions of the agreement that deal with the dividend may not necessarily form a kind of restraint on the company’s profit-making behavior, and may also form a kind of safeguard for the shareholders’ interests of the company.