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近年来互联网金融快速发展,对互联网金融的监管也随之加强。由于信息不对称和核查成本过高,互联网金融创新过程中出现诸多过度创新的风险问题。以不真实披露风险概率测度互联网金融企业的过度创新风险、以监管机构核查概率测度金融监管机构的核查力度为基础,构建监管机构与互联网金融企业间的博弈模型。研究表明,融资数量、项目周期、利率等微观决定因素影响监管机构核查力度。另外,加大对不真实披露行为的惩罚力度、增加监管机构抽查频度等也可有效控制互联网金融企业过度创新风险。
In recent years, the rapid development of Internet finance has also strengthened the regulation of Internet finance. Due to the asymmetric information and the high cost of verification, there are many risks of over-innovation in the process of Internet financial innovation. The unrealistic disclosure risk probability measures the over-innovation risk of internet financial enterprises, and the regulatory agency verifies the verification of probability of financial regulatory agencies. Based on this, a game model between regulatory agencies and internet financial enterprises is constructed. The research shows that the micro-determinants such as financing amount, project cycle and interest rate affect the verification of regulatory agencies. In addition, increasing the penalties for untrue disclosures and increasing the frequency of random checks by regulators can also effectively control the risks of over-innovation by Internet-based financial enterprises.