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运用机制设计理论,在信息不对称条件下设计了团体贷款防合谋契约.研究了政府补贴小额信贷机构和农户对团体贷款防合谋契约的影响.研究表明:小额信贷机构为规避逆向选择与道德风险设计团体贷款防合谋契约.基于该契约,高效率团队中的农户可获得一定信息租金,而其它借款团队中的农户仅获得保留效用:当小额信贷机构在部分村庄的期望收益小于0时,政府应补贴小额信贷机构以激励其提供团体贷款契约,补贴额至少需使其获得正的期望收益:政府为防止农户策略性违约需给予农户财政补贴,补贴额为还款额超过项目成功收益的部分.
Using mechanism design theory, under the condition of information asymmetry, the article designs the group loan contract prevention contract, and studies the effect of the government subsidies micro-credit institution and the peasant household on the group loan contract prevention contract.The research shows that in order to avoid the adverse selection and Based on the contract, the farmers in the efficient team can get some information rent, while the farmers in other borrowing team get only the retention effect: when the expected return of the MFI in some villages is less than 0 , The government should subsidize the MFIs to encourage them to provide group lending contracts. The amount of subsidies should at least make them obtain the positive expected benefits. The government should provide financial subsidies to farmers in order to prevent strategic defaults of farmers, and the subsidies exceed the amount of repayments The part of the profit.