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本文针对供应商的资金约束问题,研究了需求不确定条件下,两个竞争的制造商如何通过资金补偿策略改善供应商的资金约束问题.建立了包含两个竞争制造商,一个供应商在内的两阶段动态博弈模型,并给出了制造商的均衡补偿及均衡订货策略,进而分析了制造商的资金机会成本和供应商的资金水平对均衡补偿策略的影响.研究表明:当资金机会成本或供应商的资金水平低于某个临界值时,两个制造商均提供资金补偿;当资金机会成本或供应商的资金水平高于某个临界值时,两个制造商均不提供资金补偿;其余情况下,只有一个制造商提供资金补偿.最后,当供应商不提供批发价折扣时,越多的制造商进行资金补偿,供应商的收益越大.
In this paper, aiming at the problem of supplier’s capital constraint, this paper studies how the two competing manufacturers can improve the supplier’s capital constraint through the capital compensation strategy under the condition of uncertainty of demand, and establishes a system that includes two competing manufacturers and one supplier The two-stage dynamic game model is given and the manufacturer’s equilibrium compensation and equilibrium ordering strategy are given. Then the influence of the manufacturer’s capital opportunity cost and the supplier’s capital level on the equilibrium compensation strategy is analyzed.The results show that when the opportunity cost Or when the supplier’s funding level is below a certain threshold, both manufacturers provide financial compensation and both manufacturers do not provide financial compensation when the opportunity cost of funds or the supplier’s funding level is above a certain threshold In the remaining cases, only one manufacturer provides capital compensation. Finally, when the supplier does not provide the wholesale price discount, the more manufacturers make the capital compensation, the greater the profit of the supplier.